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China’s “Mercantilist” Government Subsidies, the Cost of Debt and Firm 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
China has been adopting a “mercantilist” policy by lavishing massive government 
subsidies on Chinese firms. Using hand-collected subsidy data on Chinese listed 
companies, we find that firms receiving more subsidies tend to have a lower cost of 
debt. However, such firms fail to have superior financial performance. Instead, firms 
with more subsidies tend to be overstaffed, which demonstrates higher social 
performance. These results are mainly driven by non-tax-based subsidies rather than 
tax-based subsidies. Overall, our results suggest that the Chinese government uses 
non-tax-based subsidies to achieve its social policy objectives at the expense of firms’ 
profitability. 
 
Keywords: Government subsidies; cost of debt; firm performance 
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1. Introduction 
During the past decade of the 21st century, the Chinese economy has grown by leaps 
and bounds, overtaking the economies of Germany, UK, Japan and other developed 
countries to become the second largest in the world, with a GDP of 74.4 trillion 
Chinese yuan (US$10.8 trillion) in 2016, just behind the United States. This Chinese 
phenomenon has sparked considerable interest among academics and practitioners 
concerning the factors driving such growth in China’s economy. Instead of the 
free-market economic model adopted in most developed economies, China has been 
implementing a government-planned economic model, which has so far proven to be 
a “superior economic model” (Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Grove, 2010; Stern, 2011). 
One of the key features of the government-planned economic model is that the 
Chinese government makes five-year plans and offers favorable policies to sponsored 
industries. 
Government subsidies are a form of policy instrument for the Chinese 
government to direct financial resources to industries and enterprises that it supports. 
In response to the government’s subsidies for Chinese enterprises, competitors have 
threatened retaliation for what they view as unfair trade practices. For example, a 
report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations claims that Chinese 
“state-owned enterprises receive massive state subsidies and can therefore compete 
unfairly with European companies” (Godement et al., 2011, p.5). Robert Hormats, the 
Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs at the U.S. State 
Department, argued that some “Chinese state-owned enterprises and state-supported 
enterprises enjoy financial support, regulatory privileges and immunities not generally 
available to their privately-owned competitors” (Hormats, 2011). Additionally, in a 
report issued by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Atkinson 
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(2012) stated that “it is time for policymakers in the United States and other countries 
to begin responding to today’s reality, for Chinese mercantilism represents a 
fundamental threat to not only the U.S. economy, but to the entire system of market 
and rules-based globalization.”1 
This paper examines how government subsidies affect a firm’s cost of debt and 
its subsequent performance. Prior studies have investigated the relationships between 
cost of debt and various political factors, including political connections (Li et al., 
2008), political rights (Qi et al., 2010), state ownership (Borisova and Megginson, 
2011; Borisova et al., 2012), policy risk (Bradley et al., 2012) and national five-year 
plans (Chen et al., 2013). However, as far as we are aware, there have been very few 
studies that specifically examine how government subsidies affect a firm’s cost of 
debt. This is largely because the firm-level subsidy data is not publicly available in 
most countries. Our study overcomes this obstacle by using a unique set of 
hand-collected data on Chinese government subsidies, and contributes to the literature 
on the economic consequences of government subsidies.  
We first investigate the effect of government subsidies on firms’ cost of debt. On 
the one hand, subsidies may lead to higher cost of debt, if they create moral hazards 
for managers who wish to accumulate more cash than necessary through taking excess 
loans and therefore incurring higher cost of debt. On the other hand, subsidies may 
lead to lower cost of debt if the subsidies serve as a substitute for more expensive debt 
financing. Lenders often view subsidies as either explicit or implicit government 
guarantees, which reduce the probability of default by the borrowers. In addition, 
subsidies may result in increased cash flows that benefit debt-holders more than 
                                                 
1 Mercantilism is an economic theory and practice that was dominant in Europe from the 16th to the 
18th centuries. This practice promotes governmental regulation of a nation’s economy to augment state 
power at the expense of rival national powers. Common mercantilist policies include high tariffs and 
government subsidies on domestic manufacturing and exports. 
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equity holders, because debt-holders are the first claimants upon the dissolution of a 
firm. Taken altogether, the association between subsidies and the cost of debt remains 
an empirical question. 
Our results lend support to the latter argument that subsidies are beneficial to 
firms by reducing their cost of debt. However, such benefit appears not to translate 
into superior financial performance. We find that government subsidies are not 
significantly associated with Tobin’s Q, contradicting the widespread belief that 
subsidies are an extra source of income to the recipient firms, which can boost their 
financial performance and encourage them to engage in unfair competition. Instead, 
we find a negative association between government subsidies and firms’ operating 
profitability. We believe that this lack of improvement in financial performance is 
partly because subsidies can encourage managers to become complacent, which may 
in turn lead to lower efficiency and wasted resources. In the subsequent analysis, we 
also find that firms receiving more subsidies are more likely to be overstaffed, 
consistent with Chinese government imposing unprofitable social and political goals 
on recipient firms, which impair the firms’ profitability. 
Government subsidies granted to Chinese firms are typically provided in two 
forms: tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies. The government offers tax-based 
subsidies to firms that fulfill established criteria, which are based on the national 
industrial or regional development policies. While local governments used to 
extensively offer tax incentives to subsidize the local firms, this has been abolished 
since 2007 (Lee et al., 2017). As a result, the decisions to offer tax incentives are 
largely concentrated in the hands of the central government, and the local 
governments have to resort to non-tax-based subsidies, including direct financial 
support to firms. In general, non-tax-based subsidies are granted on a more subjective 
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basis, and such subsidies are prone to the influence of political connections or 
government officials’ discretion (Lee et al., 2014). Consistent with these arguments, 
we find that non-tax-based subsidies have a greater influence on the cost of debt and 
social performance than do tax-based subsidies. 
One concern in our study is that our results may be affected by endogeneity 
because government subsidies are likely to be endogenous to other firm 
characteristics that could simultaneously influence the cost of debt and firm 
performance. To alleviate this concern, we apply a two-stage least squares regression 
and a propensity score matching approach. Our findings remain qualitatively 
unaffected. 
Finally, we provide evidence on the heterogeneous effects of government 
subsidies on cost of debt and firm performance. Our results show that the negative 
(positive) effect of subsidies on cost of debt (overstaffing) is moderated among 
politically connected firms and loss-making firms. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the institutional setting of China’s government subsidies. In Section 3, we review the 
literature and develop the hypotheses. We explain the research design and describe 
the sample and data in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. The empirical results are 
described in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. China’s “Mercantilist” Government Subsidies 
In recent years, the Chinese government has been accused of offering numerous 
subsidies that result in an unfair competitive advantage for Chinese firms in the global 
market. Haley and Haley (2013) conservatively estimate that between 1985 and 2005, 
China spent over $300 billion (in nominal terms) to support the biggest state-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs). They also estimate the amounts of subsidies to some key 
industries. For example, auto-parts businesses received subsidies worth $28 billion 
from 2001 to 2011 in the form of heavily subsidized inputs such as low-cost glass, 
steel and technology. The government has promised an additional $10.9 billion in 
subsidies to this industry by 2020. China’s “mercantilist” policy on government 
subsidies has also been criticized by international politicians and think-tanks (e.g., 
Godement et al., 2011; Hormats, 2011; Atkinson, 2012). Recently, the United States 
challenged the Chinese government in the World Trade Organization (WTO) over its 
extensive export subsidy program, given that WTO rules prohibit members from 
offering export subsidies (Donnan and Hornby, 2015). As Rodrik (2013) commented, 
“Although China phased out many of its explicit export subsidies as a condition of 
membership in the WTO (which it joined in 2001), mercantilism’s support system 
remains largely in place.” 
Government subsidies have been used as a policy tool by many countries. From 
an economic perspective, there are at least three reasons why governments may 
decide to use subsidies as a policy instrument (see the literature review in Schwartz 
and Clements, 1999). Governments use subsidies to offset various market 
imperfections, because the “invisible hand” of the free market is not sufficient to 
allocate resources in the most efficient way. Governments may also use subsidies to 
obtain economies of scale in production if some important industries are small in 
scale, and cannot compete with larger and more mature competitors in the global 
market. The third reason could be that governments attempt to use subsidies to 
accomplish their social policy objectives, such as more equitable distributions of 
consumption or income, or a lower unemployment rate. 
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The Chinese government has sought to achieve all of these objectives by offering 
massive subsidies to favored industries and enterprises. Allen et al. (2005) suggest 
that government subsidies are one of the four most important sources of financing for 
Chinese firms, along with bank loans, self-funding and foreign direct investment. 
Chinese government subsidies are pervasive and persistent, because China’s industrial 
development is directed and managed by the central government through its five-year 
plans, which started in 1953. Issued by the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China and approved by China’s National People’s Congress, the five-year 
plans establish the broad parameters of the economy, defining which industries, 
enterprises and products should be targeted for preferential government support. For 
example, the 12th Five-Year Plan, covering 2011 to 2015, proposed to address rising 
inequality and create an environment for greater sustainable growth by prioritizing 
more equitable wealth distribution, increased domestic consumption, improved social 
infrastructure and better social safety nets (KPMG, 2011). 
Both the central and local governments may subsidize firms. Since the 1980s, the 
authority for allocating government subsidies has been increasingly delegated to local 
governments. Although the local governments are guided by central government 
policies, they have been given considerable discretion to determine the amounts of 
subsidies granted to firms. The rationale is that the local governments have greater 
awareness concerning their own regions’ development needs than the central 
government. The central government then evaluates the performance of local 
government officials, based on the economic and social performance of local firms in 
their respective regions. This mode of performance evaluation, coupled with the 
delegation of authority to local governments, leads to competition among the local 
officials to boost economic growth, and to do this by assisting both firms in distress 
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and promising firms by offering them subsidies. The government subsidies granted to 
listed firms in distress can also contribute to earnings manipulation as these firms seek 
to avoid delisting (e.g., Chen and Li, 2001; Chen et al., 2008; Zhu and Chen, 2009). 
Government subsidies are provided in various forms. All of the seven types of 
government subsidies categorized by Schwartz and Clements (1999) have been used 
by the Chinese government to support various industries.2 For example, the subsidies 
granted to the steel industry include direct cash grants, energy and raw material 
grants, land grants, credit subsidies in the form of debt-equity swaps, debt 
forgiveness, tax incentives, preferential loans and directed credit from state-owned 
banks (Price et al., 2006). Most subsidies are reported quite openly, but the total 
amount of subsidies is unobservable, because a fraction of the subsidies is granted in 
the form of non-monetary supports such as price subsidies or land grants, which 
typically go unreported in company financial statements. Hence, our subsidy variables 
are likely to be underestimated, which could induce a bias against finding significant 
results. In other words, we would probably find greater use of subsidies without the 
downward bias in the means of measurement. 
In the Chinese context, our research focuses on the observable forms of 
government subsidies, which have been reported under “other income” in the firms’ 
financial statements since 2007. Prior to 2007, subsidies were reported as a separate 
line item in the income statements. According to prior literature (Zou and Adams, 
2008; Lee et al., 2014, 2017), China’s government subsidies can be classified into two 
broad categories: tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies. The tax-based subsidies are 
                                                 
2 The seven categories of government subsidies given by Schwartz and Clements (1999) are direct 
government payments to producers or consumers (cash subsidies), government guarantees and interest 
subsidies to enterprises (credit subsidies), reductions of specific tax liabilities (tax subsidies), 
government equity participation (equity subsidies), government provisions of goods and services at 
below-market prices (in-kind subsidies), government purchases of goods and services at above-market 
prices (procurement subsidies) and government regulatory actions that change market prices or market 
access (regulatory subsidies). 
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generally offered in response to China’s industrial and regional development policies. 
These subsidies are often given to firms located in special economic zones, or those 
that invest in projects and/or operate in sectors favored by the government. In general, 
tax-based subsidies are granted on a less subjective basis, as their allocation must be 
anchored on established guidelines and policies. In contrast, non-tax-based subsidies 
are granted more subjectively, at the discretion of government officials, and these 
subsidies are subject to the influence of political connections. Lee et al. (2014) use 
both interviews and archival data to reveal that Chinese tax-based subsidies are more 
transparent than non-tax-based subsidies. 
The criticisms of Chinese government subsidies motivate us to examine the 
economic consequences of the subsidies received by Chinese listed firms. Our study 
aims to investigate how government subsidies affect firms’ cost of debt and firm 
performance in both financial and social terms. We also inquire if the tax-based 
subsidies and non-tax-based subsidies have different effects, by virtue of their 
different nature. 
 
3. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Debt financing is crucial to the development and growth of Chinese firms. Allen 
et al. (2005) find that the Chinese banking sector (which is predominantly 
state-owned) is much larger than its financial market, and this dominance of banks 
over markets is greater than in many Western countries. Although non-state firms are 
typically discriminated against by the state banking sector, there are alternative 
channels for debt financing such as the non-state banking sector, venture capital, or 
reputation-based and relationship-based financing. The use of alternative informal 
financing channels may help to explain the findings of Guariglia et al. (2011) that 
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non-state firms do not experience efficiency losses from credit constraints in the 
formal banking sector. However, Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that Chinese firms with 
bank financing grow faster than firms without bank financing, and these authors 
question whether reputation- and relationship-based financing is responsible for the 
performance of the fastest-growing non-state firms in China. Furthermore, Chen et al. 
(2013) show that the firms in government-supported industries enjoy faster growth in 
equity and debt financing, with lower cost of capital than firms that are not in 
government-supported industries. These studies demonstrate that debt financing is 
crucial to Chinese firms, and that government support can influence the terms of debt 
financing. These findings provide us with a reason to study the effects that subsidies 
(as a form of government support) have on firms’ cost of debt, and consequently on 
firm performance. 
We draw on the prior literature concerning various forms of government support 
to hypothesize how government subsidies may affect both the cost of debt and firm 
performance. Government support may provide either explicit or implicit government 
guarantees to creditors, because governments are reluctant to allow the companies 
they support to default, which would cause unemployment and loss of control over 
vital industries. Therefore, debt-holders expect governments to bail out struggling 
government-supported companies, which could result in a lower cost of debt. 
Borisova and Megginson (2011) examine government ownership as a means of 
government support. They find that on average, across 60 European partially 
privatized SOEs, a one-percentage-point decrease in government ownership is 
associated with an increase of three-quarters of a basis point in credit spread.  
In contrast, Stiglitz (1993) warns that the reluctance of governments to allow 
firms to fail is likely to increase managerial moral hazard. Borisova et al. (2012) use a 
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sample of 43 countries and find that government ownership is positively associated 
with the cost of debt in non-crisis years, but negatively associated with the cost of 
debt in crisis years. They argue that there are two opposing effects of government 
ownership on the cost of debt. On the one hand, government ownership leads to 
managerial moral hazard and reduces investor monitoring. On the other hand, 
government ownership offers implicit guarantees that the government will provide 
support to avoid firm insolvencies, for the sake of maintaining social and political 
stability. During the non-crisis period, managerial moral hazard dominates over the 
government guarantees effect. However, during the crisis period, the government 
guarantees become relatively more important in reducing the cost of debt. 
We view government subsidies as a substitute form of government support or 
ownership, and we apply the same argument concerning the effects of government 
subsidies on the cost of debt. Hence, there may be two major effects of government 
subsidies on the cost of debt. Government subsidies provide financial support to 
recipient firms, and could be regarded as government guarantees by creditors. Hence 
firms with more government subsidies may have a lower cost of debt. However, 
creditors may be concerned that government subsidies will increase managerial moral 
hazard through complacency on the part of firm managers, who may aggressively take 
on greater debt and mismanage their firms. Both the moral hazard and increased 
leverage can enhance the possibility of firm default, and consequently debt investors 
may charge firms that receive subsidies higher rates for debt. Moreover, subsidies 
imply greater policy risks, as the recipient firms have to respond to the needs of the 
governments that provide them with those subsidies. Greater policy risks can lead to a 
higher cost of debt for the firm concerned (Bradley et al., 2012). Our null hypothesis, 
therefore, is formulated as follows: 
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H1a: Government subsidies have no effect on firms’ cost of debt 
 
Following Lee et al. (2014), we identify two main forms of government 
subsidies: tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies. Tax-based subsidies are granted for 
the industrial sectors or projects favored by the government, according to prescribed 
tax policies and regulations. Firms have little discretion on how these tax-based 
subsidies are granted. Thus, there is a low probability of obtaining tax-based subsidies 
through political favoritism or other opportunistic channels. Also, investors may not 
view tax-based subsidies as signals of implicit government guarantees. The interview 
findings of Lee et al. (2014) reveal that tax-based subsidies are granted on a more 
objective basis, and are less likely to be influenced by the discretion of government 
officials. 
Non-tax-based subsidies, however, are subject to greater discretion than tax-based 
subsidies. This increased discretion leads to greater moral hazard and a higher 
possibility of wasteful activities. Consequently, greater non-tax-based subsidies could 
imply more political favoritism and enhanced government support or guarantees for 
the firms receiving such subsidies. One of the comments highlighted by Lee et al. 
(2014) is that “because the fiscal resources of local governments can be limited, firms 
eligible for non-tax subsidies must be further selected and this process can involve a 
certain degree of subjectivity.” Whether the effects of non-tax-based subsidies and 
tax-based subsidies on the cost of debt are similar is an empirical question. Our null 
hypothesis is as follows: 
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H1b: Tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies have no differential effects on 
firms’ cost of debt. 
 
Firm performance is a function of the firm managers’ ability to run their firms 
efficiently and profitably, according to the available investment opportunities and 
financing cost. There may be opposing effects of subsidies on firm performance. 
Government subsidies are a direct form of support that the government provides 
to recipient firms. The competitors of Chinese firms allege that government subsidies 
provide China-based firms with an unfair competitive advantage (Schuman, 2012). If 
government subsidies are utilized well by the recipient firms, as means to improve 
their operational processes, to enhance their research and development capabilities, or 
to upgrade their marketing strategies, then these subsidies would lead to improved 
firm performance. Jacob et al. (2016) find that fund performance decreased 
substantially following the phase-out of tax subsidies for Canadian Labor-Sponsored 
Venture Capital Corporations, indicating that government subsidies in Canada has a 
positive effect on firm performance. In addition, if government subsidies result in a 
lower cost of debt, then the savings in interest and reduced cost of raising capital 
should also have a positive impact on firm performance. 
However, if government subsidies create moral hazards and lead to complacency 
on the part of managers, such subsidies may lead to worsened firm performance. This 
theory follows prior literature, which suggests a positive relationship between 
government ownership and cost of debt, due to managerial moral hazard and 
monitoring gaps (Borisova et al., 2012). Another possibility is that there may be 
conditions attached to the subsidies. The firms receiving subsidies may be obligated 
to fulfill social and political objectives imposed by the Chinese government, for 
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example, by providing greater employment to the community or protecting the 
environment. These objectives may reduce firm efficiency and lead to poorer firm 
performance. We therefore state the second null hypothesis as follows. 
 
H2a: Government subsidies have no effect on firm performance 
 
Lee et al. (2014) find that tax-based subsidies are more value-relevant than 
non-taxed-based subsidies, because “the transparency of tax based subsidies renders 
them more predictable to investors, which in turn facilitates the incorporation of this 
information into their valuation decisions.” However, tax-based subsidies do not 
contribute toward the firms’ operating profits before tax. Hence, a reduction in taxes 
through tax-based subsidies is not expected to cause better firm performance (as 
measured by operating profit before tax) even though tax-based subsidies increase the 
net income after tax. Whether tax-based subsidies improve firm performance depends 
on how the managers use the saved resources in their firms’ operations. The same 
argument applies to the non-tax-based subsidies. Hence, it is of interest to investigate 
whether tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies have different effects on firm 
performance. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2b: Tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies have no differential effects on firm 
performance. 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Government subsidies and firms’ cost of debt 
We estimate the following equation to test the relationship between government 
subsidies and the cost of debt: 
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𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (1) 
In Equation (1), i and t denote firm and year, respectively. The dependent variable is 
the cost of debt (COD). Following Zou and Adams (2008), we measure the cost of 
debt as interest expenses reported in the income statement plus capitalized interest, 
scaled by total debt. The independent variable of interest is government subsidies, 
which includes total subsidies (SUB), non-tax-based subsidies (NTSUB) and tax-based 
subsidies (TSUB). SUB is calculated as the sum of subsidies excluding credit 
subsidies, scaled by total assets.3 NTSUB (TSUB) is calculated as the non-tax-based 
(tax-based) subsidies excluding credit subsidies, scaled by total assets. Specifically, 
the tax-based subsidies include the rebates of various taxes, such as the value-added 
tax, consumption tax or export tax, and the non-tax-based subsidies are largely 
provided through direct cash grants or debt forgiveness. 
We follow prior research by including several determinants for cost of debt. 
Larger firms generally have lower default risk, and therefore may bear lower interest 
costs than smaller firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Thus, firm size (SIZE) is 
included as a control variable. The pre-subsidy return on assets (PROA) can be used 
to proxy for earnings management incentives. A higher value of PROA is indicative of 
a lower likelihood of earnings management, and hence a lower cost of debt. PROA is 
calculated as the difference between net income and total government subsidies, 
scaled by total assets. Moreover, we control for capital structure, which is measured 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEV). Higher borrowings may indicate that the 
borrower can finance with lower cost of debt. On the other hand, higher leverage 
beyond a certain level increases default risk and cost of debt. The effect of LEV on the 
                                                 
3 We exclude credit subsidies from the total amounts of government subsidies because credit subsidies 
are closely related to cost of debt. Our results are qualitatively the same when we include all subsidies 
in the empirical tests. 
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cost of debt is therefore an empirical question. In addition, younger firms tend to be 
riskier and have a higher rate of failure than long-established firms (Leeth and Scott, 
1989). As a result, younger firms may have higher cost of debt than mature firms. We 
measure the firm age (AGE) using the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
the firm’s inception. 
As Zou and Adams (2008) indicate, the influence of state ownership on the cost 
of debt is unknown ex ante. On the one hand, state ownership may expose lenders to 
higher credit risks, and therefore the lenders may require a higher interest rate than 
normal. On the other hand, a government shareholder may use its influence to help a 
firm secure favorable bank loans. Hence, we include state ownership (SOE) as a 
control variable in the model. SOE is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if 
the firm is ultimately controlled by government agencies and 0 otherwise. Likewise, 
we control for political connection (POLICON), which is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the CEO or chairman is a current or former (1) government official, (2) 
military official, (3) member of the People’s Congress or (4) member of the People’s 
Political Consultative Conference. 
Firms with more tangible assets may be able to provide more collateral, which 
reduces the risk faced by the lenders. Therefore, we expect an inverse relation 
between tangible assets ratio (TANGIBLE) and cost of debt. We define tangible asset 
intensity as the sum of fixed assets and inventory, scaled by total assets. In the same 
vein, sales growth (SG) is also expected to be negatively associated with the cost of 
debt (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The sales growth is computed as the year-on-year 
growth in sales revenue. Additionally, firms with a higher interest coverage ratio 
(COVER) are more capable of repaying their debts than those with lower interest 
coverage. The interest coverage ratio is defined as earnings before interest and tax 
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(EBIT) divided by interest charges.  
Corporate governance is also an important factor in determining a firm’s cost of 
debt. Anderson et al. (2004) find that board independence and board size are 
negatively associated with the cost of debt, because these corporate governance 
mechanisms may improve the transparency of financial information. Board size 
(BSIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of board members, and 
board independence (INDPT) is calculated as the proportion of independent directors 
on a board. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
4.2. Government subsidies and firm performance 
To further examine the effect of government subsidies on firm performance, we 
estimate the following equation: 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (2) 
where three measures are used to proxy for firm performance variables, including Q, 
OPROFIT and EXC_EMP. Q is widely used in the prior literature to measure market 
performance, and this variable is calculated as follows: (market value of common 
equity + book value of long-term debt and current liabilities) / book value of total 
assets. OPROFIT is a commonly used measure for financial profitability, which is 
calculated as operating profit divided by total assets. The OPROFIT measure may 
also eliminate the potential confounding effect of government subsidies, which are 
reported as non-operating profit in a firm’s income statements. EXC_EMP is a 
measure of excess employment. 
It has been well recognized in the prior literature that despite China’s move 
toward a market-oriented economy, local government officials still have strong 
incentives to boost employment by forcing local enterprises to limit layoffs and 
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increase job opportunities. The reason for these incentives is that social harmony and 
regional employment remain the primary objectives of local governments, and 
improvements in these areas constitute important promotion criteria for local officials 
(Lin and Li, 2004; Chen et al., 2013). This pattern of incentives is corroborated by the 
example provided by Tian and Estrin (2008).4 Following previous literature (Zeng 
and Chen, 2006; Chen et al., 2013; Wang and Wang, 2013), we use the following 
model to estimate excess employment: 
itititititi FASGAGSIZEEMP   ,4,3,2,1, ,                   (3) 
where EMP is the number of employees divided by total assets, SIZE is the logarithm 
of total assets, AG is the growth ratio of total assets, SG is the growth ratio of sales, 
and FA is fixed assets divided by total assets. We estimate the above cross-section 
regression by industry-year with at least 10 observations. The estimated residuals are 
our proxy for excess employment. 
The main independent variable in Equation (2) is also government subsidies, as 
defined in Equation (1). We include a few control variables which may also affect 
firm performance. Firm size (SIZE) has been shown to be an important determinant of 
performance. On the one hand, large firms have specialized managerial and financial 
resources, and they enjoy economies of scale in production and greater formation. On 
the other hand, large firms tend to have more layers of management and long-standing 
barriers between functional departments. Therefore, the relation between firm size and 
performance is not clear. Firm age (AGE) is also regarded as a critical factor affecting 
performance. As George (2005) indicates, resource slack is time-dependent in both its 
accumulation and deployment, so that younger firms have less slack than more 
                                                 
4 The Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited employed 38,000 people for its core 
business in 1998. When it attempted to lay off more than 17,000 employees in subsequent years, its 
government shareholder prevented the layoffs, and forced the firm to seek alternative solutions. 
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established firms. This situation puts the more established firms at a disadvantage in 
terms of future performance. 
Capital structure (LEV) is another widely accepted determinant of firm 
performance. On the one hand, debt financing exerts pressure on managers to perform, 
thereby reducing the moral hazard-related activities of managers (Jensen, 1986). On 
the other hand, higher leverage means higher agency cost due to divergence of 
interests between shareholders and debt-holders. Thus, the overall effect of leverage 
on firm performance remains unknown. 
Trueman (1986) suggests that the level of capital expenditure (CAPX) may serve 
to signal information about a project’s future returns, with a higher level of 
expenditure signaling more favorable information. Thus, we expect a positive relation 
between capital expenditure and firm value. We define the capital expenditure 
intensity as the annual expenditure in acquiring fixed and intangible assets, divided by 
total assets. Similarly, as faster growing firms tend to have higher valuation, we also 
expect a positive relation between sales growth (SG) and firm value. 
Wei et al. (2005) document a negative association between state ownership (SOE) 
and firm value. In addition the influence of political connections (POLICON) on firm 
performance is contingent on which measure of performance is used. Using ROA and 
ROE as the performance measures, Li et al. (2008) find evidence that political 
connections tend to enhance firm value. However, drawing on market measures of 
performance such as stock returns, Fan et al. (2007) find that political connections 
destroy firm value for IPO firms. Both state ownership and political connection are 
included to control for the effects of government intervention on firm performance. 
Finally, we consider the influence of board attributes on firm performance. In 
particular, the board size (BSIZE) effect has been widely discussed in prior literature. 
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There are two opposing views. Some studies find that as the board size increases, 
there are greater difficulties with communication and coordination, which can limit 
firm value (Eisenberg et al., 1998). However, Dalton et al. (1999) conduct a 
meta-analysis of 131 firms which documents a significantly positive relation between 
board size and financial performance. In addition, board independence (INDPT) is 
believed to have an effect on firm performance (e.g., Baysinger et al., 1985; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Dalton et al., 1999). Thus, both board size and board 
independence are included as control variables. 
To address the potential reverse causality issues that could arise from estimating a 
contemporaneous relation between government subsidies and the dependent variables, 
we apply a lead-lag approach in which the dependent variables in Equations (1) and (2) 
are one year ahead of the independent and control variables. In addition, to control for 
year and industry fixed effects, we include the year and industry dummy variables. 
 
5. Sample and Data 
We manually collect data on government subsidies, including the total subsidies, 
credit subsidies, tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies. In addition, the data on 
political connections and the characteristics of provincial leaders are hand-collected 
from multiple sources, including annual reports and the websites of local governments. 
The remaining data used in this study are obtained from the China Securities Markets 
and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
We begin our sample selection with all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2007 to 2011. Our sample period begins in 2007 because this 
was the first year in which all Chinese listed firms were mandated to adopt a new set 
of accounting standards under which the recognition and measurement of government 
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subsidies are different from those under the old Chinese GAAP.5 As the tests of our 
hypotheses require that the dependent variables are one year ahead of the independent 
variables, the data collection period ends in 2012 rather than 2011. Of the 9,312 
non-financial firm-year observations available for the sample period, we eliminate 
1,692 observations with missing values on subsidies, 754 observations with missing 
values on the cost of debt and 2,713 observations with insufficient data on other 
variables. This leaves us with a final sample of 4,153 firm-year observations (1,239 
unique firms) to test the hypotheses throughout the study. Panel A of Table 1 
summarizes our sample selection process. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the distribution of firm-years across industries, which 
are classified according to China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
categories. The five industries with the highest percentage of subsidized firms include 
Timber and Furnishing (100%), Electronics (97.81%), Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery (95.40%), Communication and Culture (94.00%), and Information 
Technology (93.97%). This pattern is generally consistent with the prioritized 
industries as designated in China’s 11th Five-year Plan (2006-2010). 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of variables used in the main analyses. 
The average percentages of government subsidies over total assets, non-tax-based 
subsidies over total assets, and tax-based subsidies over total assets in the sample are 
0.4%, 0.4% and 0.1%, respectively. Unreported data reveal that the average 
                                                 
5 In the old Chinese GAAP, the government subsidies were largely recognized as subsidy income. The 
accounting method under new Chinese GAAP is based on whether the government subsidy is related to 
income or to assets. Subsidies that are related to income (assets) should be recognized as profit or loss 
(deferred income, and amortized to profit or loss on a straight-line basis over the useful life of the 
asset). 
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percentage of government subsidies over total sales is 1.3%. The sample firms have 
an average cost of debt of 9.3%, leverage of 23.2% and average PROA of 2.5%. More 
than half (65.9%) of the firms in the sample are SOEs and 17.2% are politically 
connected. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Main analyses 
This subsection presents the main empirical results on the effects that government 
subsidies have on firms’ cost of debt and firm performance. Table 3 reports the results 
concerning the relationship between government subsidies and the firms’ cost of debt. 
In general, government subsidies have a negative effect on firms’ cost of debt. 
Column (1) reveals that the estimated coefficient on SUB is -0.622, with a statistical 
significance level at the 5%. The other three columns indicate that this negative 
association exists largely for non-tax-based subsidies. These results are consistent 
with the argument that government subsidies, especially non-tax-based subsidies, 
provide government support for these firms to enhance their credit standings, reduce 
the credit risks for lenders to these firms, and thus reduce the firms’ cost of debt. 
These results are also consistent with prior evidence that government support through 
government ownership, government control and/or political connections is negatively 
related to the cost of debt (Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Houston et al., 2014). The 
estimated coefficients on the control variables show that firms with higher 
pre-subsidy ROA (PROA) and higher leverage (LEV) incur lower cost of debt. 
 
       [Insert Table 3] 
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Table 4 shows the effects of government subsidies on the firms’ market 
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) and accounting performance (measured by 
operating profit). Panel A shows that neither the non-tax-based nor the tax-based 
subsidies have a significant effect on the firms’ market performance. Panel B shows 
the regression results for the firms’ accounting performance. As shown in Column (5), 
there is a statistically significantly negative relation between government subsidies 
and OPROFIT. The significance of the coefficient of non-tax-based subsidies 
(NTSUB) remains when we decompose SUB into tax-based and non-tax-based 
subsidies. In contrast, the relation between tax-based subsidies and accounting 
performance is significantly positive, as shown in Columns (7) and (8). Overall, 
government subsidies have a mixed effect on firms’ financial performance. 
Regarding the control variables, the results are also inconsistent. Panel A reveals 
that larger firms, firms with lower capital expenditures, and firms with fewer 
independent directors have lower future Tobin’s Q. Nevertheless, in Panel B, the 
above firms have higher future operating profits. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
In addition to the financial performance, we use the excess employment measure 
to assess the firms’ social performance. The effects of government subsidies on firm 
social performance are reported in Table 5. There is a statistically significant 
association between government subsidies and social performance. The estimated 
coefficient on SUB reported in Column (1) is 4.307, with a t-statistic of 2.102 and a 
significance level of 5%. This result indicates that firms with more government 
subsidies tend to hire more employees than necessary, which is consistent with 
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Chinese government imposing social objectives when offering government subsidies 
to firms. The excess employment may be detrimental to firm financial performance, 
which helps to explain the inconsistent results observed in Table 4. In the same vein, 
we decompose government subsidies into tax-based and non-tax-based subsidies. The 
positive effect of government subsidies on the firms’ excess employment only appears 
with non-tax-based subsidies, as shown in Columns (2) and (4). This set of results is 
consistent with the notion that non-tax-based subsidies are more subjective and more 
at the discretion of the government. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
6.2. Robustness Tests 
6.2.1. Instrumental variable estimation 
Thus far in our main empirical tests, we assume that government subsidies are 
exogenously determined. However, the decisions of Chinese governments (central and 
local) on whether and how to subsidize firms in their jurisdictions may depend on a 
number of additional factors, which could bias the coefficient estimates in the main 
regressions. To enhance the robustness of our results, we apply a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation, and then repeat our main analyses. 
In the first stage, we examine possible determinants of government subsidies, i.e., 
what kind of firms are more likely to receive subsidies. We follow the existing 
literature to identify the determinants of government subsidies in China, and use the 
following equation to empirically test those determinants: 
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(4) 
where i and t denote the sample firm and year, respectively. We explain each of the 
determinants as follows: 
Firm size: Large firms tend to receive more subsidies, because these firms are 
more important to the economy than small firms in terms of economic benefit and 
employment. Thus, both central and local governments are more concerned about 
large firms when they face financial difficulties. 
Pre-subsidy ROA: Prior studies (Chen et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2014) suggest that 
local governments are likely to assist the listed firms in their jurisdictions to engage in 
earnings management. This is done to circumvent the central government’s 
regulations over firm profitability. Thus, local governments may help firms with lower 
pre-subsidy ROA through giving more subsidies. 
Leverage: The subsidies that a firm receives can be viewed as substitutes to 
external debt. A firm that is less dependent on and obtains less external debt may 
receive more subsidies. 
Firm Age: The level of subsidies may depend on the age of the firms if the 
government policy is to support young start-up firms with more subsidies. 
State ownership: Zhu and Chen (2009) predict that state shareholdings should 
facilitate access to subsidies, as governments may provide financial assistance to 
firms in which they retain large stakes (Wei et al., 2005). However, Zhu and Chen 
(2009) fail to find empirical support for this view. 
Political connection: Prior literature consistently suggests that political 
connections facilitate connected firms to gain preferential treatment, to lessen 
financial constraints, and to reduce the transaction cost involved in searching for and 
complying with regulatory or licensing procedures (Srinidh et al., 2011; Chaney et al., 
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2011). Both Qin (2011) and Feng et al. (2015) provide evidence suggesting a positive 
association between political connections and government subsidies in the Chinese 
context. 
Tangibility: This variable measures the fixed asset/inventory intensity of firms. 
Firms with more fixed assets/inventory may obtain more government support in 
subsidies. 
Sales growth: The government may provide greater subsidies to support firms that 
have higher sales growth. 
Interest cover: Firms that have lower interest coverage ratios may be in greater 
need of government subsidy support. 
Again, Board size and percentage of independent directors are used as measures 
of firm corporate governance. 
The last two variables (PRO_LOCAL and PROB_SUB) are instrumental variables 
(IVs) employed in the 2SLS tests, which are selected based on prior literature (Lee et 
al., 2017; He, 2016). PRO_LOCAL is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
provincial leader was promoted from a lower position within the same province. 
Provincial leaders who have been promoted from within the same province tend to 
favor local firms by offering government subsidies. PROB_SUB is the median 
percentage of subsidized firms in each industry-year-region group. Subsidies are 
likely to be higher when the proportion of subsidized firms in an industry-year-region 
is higher. Neither of these IVs is likely to have a direct effect on the cross-sectional 
variation in the firm-level cost of debt. For testing the effects of subsidies on firm 
performance, we keep PROB_SUB, but replace PRO_LOCAL with PROTECT_IND, 
which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for protected industries (i.e., high tech, 
agriculture and public utilities). We drop PRO_LOCAL because the promotion of 
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provincial leaders is expected to be positively associated with the local employment 
rate and firm profitability. However, firms in protected industries receive more fiscal 
support without such obligations. Thus, we believe that PROTECT_IND is a valid IV 
in these cases. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there may be imperfections in the 
IVs, which may affect the dependent variables in ways that we did not envisage. 
Table 6 presents the results for the 2SLS regressions, where the endogenous 
variables, SUB, NTSUB and TSUB, are evaluated separately. Panel A reports the 
results of regressing the cost of debt on government subsidies. In the second stage 
regressions, the results suggest that subsidies, especially their non-tax-based 
components, significantly reduce the cost of debt, consistent with the results reported 
in Table 3. In the first stage regression, PRO_LOCAL and PROB_SUB are positively 
associated with government subsidies, which is in line with our predictions. 
Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics range from 62.4 to 72.9, and are 
statistically significant at the 1% levels, which indicate that the models are not subject 
to weak instrument problems. 
Panel B and C present the results on the effects of subsidies on financial 
performance and social performance, respectively. In the interest of space, we report 
the second stage results only. Similar to the results reported in Table 4, we find in 
Panel B mixed impact of subsidies on financial performance. Column (3) of Panel B 
shows a negative association between tax-based subsidies and Tobin’s Q but Column 
(6) reports a positive association with firm’s operating profit. In line with the results 
reported in Table 5, we find in Panel C a positive effect of subsidies on social 
performance, and especially so in the case of non-tax-based subsidies. Again, both 
instruments have their predicted signs, and the diagnostic tests suggest that the IVs are 
valid. 
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[Insert Table 6] 
 
6.2.2. Propensity score matching 
As a further robustness check, we use a propensity score matching (PSM) 
procedure, which allows us to identify a control group of firms that are not subsidized, 
and test if there are observable differences in the characteristics of non-subsidized 
firms relative to firms that are subsidized. Matching observable firm characteristics 
aims to mitigate (but not to eliminate) concerns over non-random selection. The 
propensity score is calculated by projecting the probability of a firm being subsidized 
on the determinants identified in Equation (4). To ensure that the firms in the control 
group are sufficiently similar to those in the treatment group, we perform a radius 
matching with the common support required. Panel A of Table 7 reveals that after 
matching, the treatment and control groups appear to be largely indistinguishable in 
terms of the characteristics mentioned above. This test further confirms the validity of 
our matching strategy. The results based on the PSM sample are presented in Table 7 
Panel B, and they provide additional evidence that our main findings are robust to 
alternative model specifications. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
6.2.3. Market-based debt versus government debt 
 There is a possibility that Chinese banks, especially state-owned banks, may offer 
credit subsidies to preferred companies and hence the negative relation between 
government subsidies and cost of debt is mechanical among firms with loans from 
state-owned banks. Relative to state-owned banks, non-state-owned banks tend to 
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make lending decisions on a more commercial basis. The negative relation between 
government subsidies and cost of debt might be weaker among firms that borrow 
from non-state-owned banks. This is a lesser issue in our sample period of 2007-2011 
because prior literature (e.g., Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013) suggests that 
China’s recent banking reforms such as commercialization and privatization lead to 
lending decisions being made on a more commercial basis. Moreover, our subsidy 
variable excludes credit subsidies from the government subsidies. 
 Nonetheless, we carry out further robustness test by identifying whether the 
major creditors are state-owned or non-state-owned banks. The lender information is 
obtained from the CSMAR database. However, since only a few companies disclosed 
relevant information in their annual reports, we have to use a reduced sample for this 
robustness test. Since a majority of the firms borrowed from both state-owned and 
non-state-owned banks, we classify the firms based on the share of loans from 
state-owned versus non-state-owned banks. For instance, if the loans from 
state-owned (non-state-owned) banks account for more than 50% of a firm’s total 
borrowing, we classify the firm’s lenders as state-owned (non-state-owned) banks. 
Table 8 reports the results regarding the effects of government subsidies on cost of 
debt, disaggregated into state-owned and non-state-owned banks. For both types of 
loans, the results are consistent with cost of debt being negatively associated with 
government subsidies, in particular non-tax subsidies. This indicates that our main 
results are not affected by the sources of loans. 
 
[Insert Table 8] 
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6.2.4. Impact of subsidies on firm performance: change model specification 
In the analysis of subsidy impact on firm financial performance, if the subsidies 
are provided to bailout firms in financial distress, the recipients are naturally 
characterized with lower Q and poorer performance relative to other firms. Similarly, 
regarding social performance, the heavily staffed firms, especially SOEs, are more 
likely to receive subsidies. Given the stability of employees, it is natural to observe 
excessive employment in the future. It is however unlikely that the situation can be 
reversed in one year after it has received subsidies. 
Hence, we carried out a further analysis on Table 4 by using the change in Q and 
change in operating profit, and on Table 5 by using the change in social performance. 
The results are reported in Table 9. In Panel A, the change in subsidy and change in 
non-tax-based subsidy coefficients are negative and statistically significant when the 
dependent is the change in Q, and not statistically significant when the dependent 
variable is the change in operating profit. In Panel B, the change in subsidy and 
change in non-tax-based subsidy coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
when the dependent variable is the change in social performance. These results are 
consistent with the results reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
 
6.2.5. Political connection and financial health interactions with subsidies 
 We examine further the variations in the impact of subsidies on cost of debt and 
performance. The impact of subsidies may vary across the level of political 
connections as well as financial health of firms. The variables POLICON and LOSS 
are interacted with SUB, NTSUB and TSUB in Panels A and B of Table 10, 
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respectively. LOSS is a dummy variable that equals one if pre-subsidy net income is 
below zero, and otherwise zero. 
Table 10 shows that the subsidy (specifically non-tax-based subsidy) effect 
(without interactions with POLICON and LOSS) on cost of debt remains negative and 
statistically significant. In the first column of Panel A (B), the negative coefficient of 
SUB indicates that 1% increase in scaled government subsidies corresponds with 8.0% 
(12.1%) decline in cost of debt. The interactions of SUB and NTSUB with POLICON 
and LOSS are positive and statistically significant. In the first column of Panel A (B), 
the negative coefficient of SUB interaction with POLICON (LOSS) shows that for 1% 
increase in government subsidies, the decline in cost of debt is relatively smaller by 
7.4% (11.3%) for politically connected (loss-making) firms. This indicates that the 
subsidy effects on cost of debt are substantially weaker for politically connected or 
loss-making firms. 
When financial performance is used as the dependent variable, the results remain 
mixed. The coefficients of SUB and NTSUB are positive and statistically significant in 
the case when OPROFIT is used as the dependent variable, but not statistically 
significant when Q is used as the dependent variable. When social performance 
becomes the dependent variable, the coefficients of SUB and NTSUB are positive and 
statistically significant, while the interactions of SUB and NTSUB with POLICON are 
negative and statistically significant. This shows that the effects of subsidy on social 
performance are weaker for politically connected firms. 
In Panel B, when OPROFIT is used as the dependent variable, the coefficients of 
SUB, NTSUB and TSUB are positive and statistically significant. The interactions of 
SUB and NTSUB with LOSS are negative and statistically significant. This shows that 
the positive effects of subsidies on operating profit only apply for profitable firms. In 
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the case when Q and EXC_EMP are used as the dependent variables, the coefficients 
of SUB and NTSUB, and their interactions with LOSS are not statistically significant. 
These results provide evidence that the effects of subsidies on cost of debt and firm 
performance are not solely driven by political connections and financial health of 
firms. 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
6.2.6. Alternative measures for government subsidies 
We also apply alternative measures for government subsidies, such as the natural 
logarithm of subsidies and subsidies scaled by total sales. The untabulated results 
suggest that our main findings remain qualitatively unaffected.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In the past three decades, the Chinese economy has experienced unusually high 
growth, and has emerged as the second largest economy in terms of GDP, just behind 
the United States. However, the international economic community has criticized the 
Chinese government for offering pervasive “mercantilist” government subsidies to the 
various industries it supports. This research provides a comprehensive examination of 
the effects of government subsidies on the sample firms’ cost of debt and their 
performance in both financial and social terms. 
Using hand-collected information on government subsidies to 1,239 Chinese 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, we investigate the 
economic consequences of government subsidies on the firms’ cost of debt and on 
firm performance. We find that government subsidies, especially the non-tax-based 
subsidies, lead to lower cost of debt, because debt investors view non-tax-based 
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subsidies as implicit government guarantees, which reduce the probability of default 
by the borrowers. 
However, the lower cost of debt does not always translate into improved firm 
performance. We find limited evidence that financial performance improves as a 
result of receiving government subsidies. This result contradicts the common belief 
that subsidies are additional income to the recipient firms, which enables them to 
compete by reducing the prices of their products or by enlarging their market share. 
We argue that the observed lack of improvement in financial performance is caused 
by the social and political goals imposed by the Chinese government. We find that 
firms with higher non-tax-based government subsidies demonstrate higher social 
performance in terms of excess employment. Overall, our results are robust to tests on 
endogeneity in the relations between government subsidies, cost of debt, and firm 
performance. 
 
 34 
References 
Allen, F., Qian, J., Qian, M., 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. 
Journal of Financial Economics 77, 57-116. 
 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., Reeb, D. M., 2004. Board characteristics, accounting 
report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (3), 
315-342. 
 
Atkinson, R. D., 2012. Enough is enough: Confronting Chinese innovation 
mercantilism. The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. 
Downloadable from 
http://www.itif.org/publications/2012/02/28/enough-enough-confronting-chinese-inno
vation-mercantilism 
 
Ayyagari, M., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 2010. Formal versus informal 
finance: Evidence from China. Review of Financial Studies 23, 3048-3097. 
 
Baysinger, B. D., Butler, H. N., 1985. Corporate governance and the board of 
directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 1 (1), 101-124. 
 
Borisova, G., Fotak, V., Holland, K., Megginson, W. L., 2015. Government 
ownership and the cost of debt: Evidence from government investments in publicly 
traded firms. Journal of Financial Economics 118 (1), 168-191. 
 
Borisova, G., Megginson, W. L., 2011. Does government ownership affect the cost of 
debt? Evidence from privatization. Review of Financial Studies 24, 2693-2737. 
 
Bradley, D., Pantzalis, C., Yuan, X., 2016. Policy risk, corporate political strategies, 
and the cost of debt. Journal of Corporate Finance 40, 254-275. 
 
Brandt, L., Rawski, T. G., 2008. China’s Great Economic Transformation, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chaney, P. K., Faccio, M., Parsley, D., 2011. The quality of accounting information in 
politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 (1), 58-76. 
 
Chen, D., Li, O. Z., Xin, F., 2013. Five-year plans, China finance and their 
consequences. Working paper, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2259388 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2259388 
 
Chen, X., Lee, C. J., Li, J., 2008. Government assisted earnings management in 
China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 262-274.  
 
Chen, X., Li, J., 2001. Exploring the role of local government fiscal supports in 
accounting performance of the listed companies. Kuaiji Yanjiu (Journal of Accounting 
Research) 12, 20-28 (in Chinese). 
 
 35 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., Ellstrand, A. E., 1999. Number of 
directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management 
Journal 42 (6), 674-686. 
 
Donnan, S., Hornby, L., 2015. US challenges ‘illegal’ Chinese export subsidies. The 
Financial Times, February 11, 2015. 
 
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., Wells, M. T., 1998. Larger board size and decreasing 
firm value in small firms, Journal of Financial Economics 48 (1), 35-54. 
 
Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J., Zhang, T., 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate 
governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. 
Journal of Financial Economics 84 (2), 330-357. 
 
Feng, X., Johansson, A., Zhang, T., 2015. Mixing business with politics: Political 
participation by entrepreneurs in China. Journal of Banking & Finance 59, 220-235. 
 
Firth, M., Lin, C., Liu, P., & Wong, S. M., 2009. Inside the black box: Bank credit 
allocation in China’s private sector. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (6), 1144-1155. 
 
George, G., 2005. Slack resources and the performance of privately held firms. 
Academy of Management Journal 48 (4), 661-676. 
 
Godement, F, Parello-Plesner, J., Richard, A., 2011. China’s scramble for Europe. 
European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR37_Scramble_For_Europe_AW_v4.pdf 
 
Grove, A., 2010. How America can create jobs. Businessweek. July 1, 2010. Available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/10_28/b4186048358596.htm 
 
Guariglia, A., Liu, X., Song, L., 2011. Internal finance and growth: Microeconometric 
evidence on Chinese firms. Journal of Development Economics 96, 79-94. 
 
Haley, U., Haley G., 2013. Subsidies to Chinese Industry: State Capitalism, Business 
Strategy and Trade Policy. Oxford University Press. 
 
He, G., 2016. Fiscal support and earnings management. The International Journal of 
Accounting 51(1), 57-84. 
 
Hormats, R. D., 2011. Addressing the Challenges of the China Model. U.S. 
Department of State. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/20092013/2011/157205.htm 
 
Houston, J. F., Jiang, L., Lin, C., Ma, Y., 2014. Political connections and the cost of 
bank loans, Journal of Accounting Research 52 (1), 193-243. 
 
Jacob, M., S. Johan, D. Schweizer, F. Zhan, 2016. Corporate finance and the 
governance implications of removing government support programs. Journal of 
Banking & Finance 63, 35-47. 
 
 36 
Jensen, M. C., 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review 76 (2), 323-329. 
 
KPMG, 2011. China’s 12th Five Year Plan: Overview. Available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/publicationseries/5
-years-plan/Pages/default.aspx 
 
Lee, E., Walker, M., Zeng, C., 2014. Do Chinese government subsidies affect firm 
value? Accounting, Organizations and Society 39 (3), 149-169. 
 
Lee, E., Walker, M., Zeng, C., 2017. Do Chinese state subsidies affect voluntary 
corporate social responsibility disclosure? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
36 (3), 179-200. 
 
Leeth, J. D., Scott, J. A., 1989. The incidence of secured debt: Evidence from the 
small business community. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24 (3), 
379-394. 
 
Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., Zhou, L., 2008. Political connections, financing and firm 
performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development 
Economics 87, 283-299.  
 
Lin, J. Y., Li, Z., 2004. Policy burden, moral hazard and soft budget constraint. 
Economic Research Journal 2, 17-27 (in Chinese). 
 
Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., 1994. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence 
from small business data. Journal of Finance 49 (1), 3-37. 
 
Price, A., Weld, C., Nance, D., Zucker, P., 2006. The China Syndrome: How 
Subsidies and Government Intervention Created the World’s Largest Steel Industry. 
Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP. 
 
Qi, Y., Roth, L., Wald, J. K., 2010. Political rights and the cost of debt. Journal of 
Financial Economics 95, 202-226.  
 
Qin, B., 2011. Political Connection, Government patronage and firm performance: 
Evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms. Working paper, University of Hong 
Kong. 
 
Rodrik, D., 2013. The New Mercantilist Challenge. Project Syndicate. Available at 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-mercantilism-by-dani-rod
rik 
 
Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J. G., 1990. Outside directors, board independence, and 
shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 26 (2), 175-191. 
 
Schuman, M., 2012. Are China’s big state companies a big problem for the global 
economy? Time. February 15 
 
 37 
Schwartz, G., Clements, B., 1999. Government subsidies. Journal of Economic 
Surveys 13 (2), 119-147. 
 
Srinidh, B., Zhang, H., Zhang, T., 2011. Transparency in politically connected firms: 
Evidence from private sector firms in China. Working paper, City University of Hong 
Kong. 
 
Stern, A., 2011. China’s superior economic model. The Wall Street Journal. 
December 1, 2011. Available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204630904577056490023451980 
 
Stiglitz, J. E., 1993. The role of the state in financial markets. Proceedings of the 
World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 19-61. 
 
Tian, L., Estrin, S., 2008. Retained state shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does 
government ownership always reduce corporate value? Journal of Comparative 
Economics 36 (1), 74-89. 
 
Trueman, B., 1986. The relationship between the level of capital expenditures and 
firm value. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21 (2), 115-129. 
 
Wang, X., Wang, S., 2013. Chairman’s government background, excess employment 
and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises. 
China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (1), 51-74. 
 
Wei, Z., Xie, F., Zhang, S., 2005. Ownership structure and firm value in China’s 
privatized firms: 1991–2001. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40 (1), 
87-108. 
 
Zeng, Q., Chen, X., 2006. State stockholder, excessive employment and labor cost. 
Economic Research Journal 5, 74-86 (in Chinese). 
 
Zhu, S., Chen, Y. S., 2009. Government subsidy decisions, earnings management 
incentives, and loss reversals of listed firms. China Accounting and Finance Review 
11 (3), 115-140. 
 
Zou, H., Adams, M. B., 2008. Debt capacity, cost of debt, and corporate insurance. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43 (2), 433-466. 
 38 
APPENDIX 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variables 
COD (Interest expenses + capitalized interest)/total debt 
Q  (Market value of common equity + book value of long-term debt and 
current liabilities)/book value of total assets 
OPROFIT Operating profit/total assets 
EXC_EMP Residuals estimated from the following equation: 
itititititi FASGAGSIZEEMP   ,4,3,2,1,  
where EMP is the number of employees divided by total assets, SIZE 
is the logarithm of total assets, AG is the growth ratio of total assets, 
SG is the growth ratio of sales, and FA is fixed assets divided by total 
assets. 
 
Independent variables 
SUB Total government subsidies excluding credit subsidies, scaled by 
total assets 
NTSUB Non-tax-based government subsidies excluding credit subsidies, 
scaled by total assets 
TSUB Tax-based government subsidies, scaled by total assets 
 
Control variables 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
PROA Pre-subsidy ROA, measured as (net income – subsidies)/total assets 
ROS Sales revenue/total assets 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets 
AGE Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s inception 
SOE = 1 for firms ultimately controlled by government agencies, and 
otherwise 0 
POLICON = 1 if a CEO or a chairman is defined as politically connected, i.e., if 
he or she is a current or former (1) government official, (2) military 
official, (3) member of the People’s Congress or (4) member of the 
People’s Political Consultative Conference 
CAPX Annual expenditure in acquiring fixed assets and intangible assets 
divided by total assets 
TANGIBLE The sum of fixed assets and inventory, scaled by total assets 
COVER EBIT scaled by interest charges (interest expense + capitalized 
interest) 
SG (Current sales revenue-last year’s sales revenue)/last year’s sales 
revenue 
BSIZE Natural logarithm of the number of board members 
INDPT The percentage of independent directors in a board 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample selection process Observations 
Initial firm-year sample 
Less:  
9,312 
  Observations with missing total or classified subsidies 1,692 
Observations with missing values on cost of debt 754 
  Observations with missing values on other variables 2,713 
Final sample  4,153 
 
Panel B: Distribution of firm-years by industry 
Industry CSRC code # of firm-years 
% of subsidized 
firm-years  
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery A 87 95.40 
Mining B 117 80.34 
Food & Drink  C0 178 92.13 
Textiles & Apparel C1 149 89.93 
Timber & Furnishings C2 8 100.00 
Paper & Printing C3 64 89.06 
Petrochemicals C4 420 93.10 
Electronics C5 184 97.81 
Metals & Non-metals C6 380 90.53 
Machinery C7 637 92.46 
Pharmaceuticals C8 273 93.77 
Other Manufacturing C9 24 83.33 
Utilities D 237 82.70 
Construction E 80 86.25 
Transportation F 176 72.73 
Information Technology G 199 93.97 
Wholesale & Retail Trade H 321 80.06 
Real Estate J 356 60.67 
Social Services K 50 66.00 
Communication & Culture L 50 94.00 
Comprehensive M 163 88.96 
Total  4,153 86.64 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of variables used in the main analyses. The variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. All variables except dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. 
 
 Mean Std. p25 p50 p75 
CODt+1 0.093 0.116 0.048 0.068 0.095 
Qt+1 1.954 1.217 1.213 1.540 2.191 
OPROFITt+1 0.026 0.070 0.005 0.028 0.059 
EXC_EMPt+1 0.244 0.567 0.000 0.000 0.181 
SUBt 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.005 
NTSUBt 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.004 
TSUBt 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZEt 21.951 1.228 21.096 21.859 22.698 
ROSt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PROAt 0.025 0.064 0.007 0.027 0.052 
LEVt 0.232 0.151 0.113 0.218 0.331 
COVERt 6.325 53.400 2.444 5.185 11.536 
TANGIBLEt 0.462 0.180 0.331 0.463 0.595 
SGt 19.311 39.320 0.632 14.486 31.375 
CAPXt 0.319 0.204 0.159 0.294 0.464 
AGEt 15.663 4.235 12.000 15.000 18.000 
POLICONt 0.172 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SOEt 0.659 0.474 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BSIZEt 2.201 0.204 2.197 2.197 2.303 
INDPTt 0.365 0.050 0.333 0.333 0.375 
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Table 3: Government Subsidies and the Cost of Debt 
This table presents OLS regression results regarding the effect of government subsidies in 
year t on cost of debt in year t+1. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables 
except dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in 
parentheses are t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * 
indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed t-tests. 
 Dependent = CODt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUBt -0.622**    
 (-2.442)    
NTSUBt  -0.653**  -0.641** 
  (-2.113)  (-2.074) 
TSUBt   -0.830* -0.752 
   (-1.656) (-1.502) 
SIZEt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.052) (-0.028) (-0.019) (-0.049) 
PROAt -0.246*** -0.248*** -0.231*** -0.247*** 
 (-5.002) (-4.980) (-4.829) (-4.964) 
LEVt -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.127*** 
 (-5.199) (-5.206) (-5.136) (-5.203) 
AGEt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.041) (1.093) (1.030) (1.033) 
SOEt -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.539) (-0.571) (-0.587) (-0.541) 
POLICONt -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.046) (-1.092) (-1.086) (-1.040) 
TANGIBLEt -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 
 (-0.940) (-0.945) (-1.003) (-0.941) 
SGt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.595) (-0.754) (-0.470) (-0.551) 
COVERt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.827) (0.859) (0.823) (0.823) 
BSIZEt -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.013) (-0.033) (0.039) (0.000) 
INDPTt -0.058 -0.059 -0.056 -0.059 
 (-1.594) (-1.620) (-1.538) (-1.601) 
Constant 0.083 0.081 0.079 0.083 
 (1.530) (1.500) (1.458) (1.523) 
YEAR Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.045 
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Table 4: Government Subsidies and Financial Performance 
This table presents OLS regression results regarding the effect of government subsidies in year t on financial 
performance (Tobin’s Q in Panel A and operating profit in Panel B) in year t+1. The variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. All variables except the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers 
reported in parentheses are t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate 
significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed t-tests. 
 Panel A: Dependent = Qt+1  Panel B: Dependent = OPROFITt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SUBt 1.917     -0.381**    
 (0.667)     (-2.061)    
NTSUBt  2.942  3.027   -0.729***  -0.746*** 
  (0.917)  (0.945)   (-3.814)  (-3.875) 
TSUBt   -6.655 -6.961    1.334*** 1.410*** 
   (-0.923) (-0.975)    (2.818) (3.041) 
SIZEt -0.446*** -0.445*** -0.447*** -0.446***  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (-16.098) (-16.124) (-16.193) (-16.112)  (8.926) (8.878) (9.146) (8.952) 
AGEt 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.435) (1.419) (1.367) (1.371)  (-1.356) (-1.300) (-1.071) (-1.095) 
LEVt -0.110 -0.109 -0.114 -0.110  -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.145*** 
 (-0.566) (-0.560) (-0.583) (-0.563)  (-13.013) (-13.039) (-12.953) (-13.028) 
CAPXt 0.405** 0.401** 0.419** 0.404**  -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.034*** 
 (2.336) (2.321) (2.440) (2.336)  (-3.338) (-3.224) (-3.629) (-3.281) 
SGt -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-5.865) (-5.759) (-5.473) (-5.363)  (1.478) (1.080) (0.551) (0.205) 
SOEt -0.217*** -0.218*** -0.214*** -0.216***  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-4.117) (-4.119) (-4.036) (-4.087)  (-3.044) (-3.007) (-3.251) (-3.106) 
POLICONt -0.022 -0.022 -0.019 -0.019  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (-0.380) (-0.371) (-0.315) (-0.326)  (3.029) (3.022) (2.798) (2.857) 
BSIZEt 0.076 0.077 0.078 0.080  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.607) (0.619) (0.623) (0.644)  (-0.330) (-0.376) (-0.381) (-0.454) 
INDPTt 0.961** 0.966** 0.963** 0.971**  -0.070** -0.071** -0.070** -0.072** 
 (2.259) (2.271) (2.257) (2.278)  (-2.446) (-2.504) (-2.464) (-2.549) 
Constant 12.298*** 12.289*** 12.343*** 12.301***  -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.189*** -0.178*** 
 (20.268) (20.311) (20.351) (20.295)  (-5.236) (-5.162) (-5.516) (-5.251) 
YEAR Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153  4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.371  0.199 0.202 0.199 0.205 
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Table 5: Government Subsidies and Social Performance 
This table presents OLS regression results on the effect of government subsidies in year t on 
social performance in year t+1. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables except 
the dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in 
parentheses are t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * 
indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed t-tests. 
 Dependent = EXC_EMPt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUBt 4.307**    
 (2.102)    
NTSUBt  4.636**  4.610** 
  (2.048)  (2.040) 
TSUBt   2.582 2.118 
   (0.461) (0.381) 
SIZEt -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.112*** -0.109*** 
 (-7.204) (-7.211) (-7.310) (-7.218) 
LEVt -0.180* -0.181* -0.186* -0.180* 
 (-1.668) (-1.672) (-1.725) (-1.671) 
AGEt 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (1.618) (1.551) (1.574) (1.581) 
TANGIBLEt 0.122 0.120 0.121 0.121 
 (1.415) (1.391) (1.395) (1.395) 
ROSt 5.975** 5.920** 5.955** 5.939** 
 (2.115) (2.105) (2.083) (2.109) 
SGt -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-2.884) (-2.660) (-2.857) (-2.650) 
CAPXt 0.146 0.149 0.169 0.147 
 (1.434) (1.469) (1.639) (1.454) 
SOEt 0.046 0.047 0.049 0.046 
 (1.530) (1.558) (1.623) (1.545) 
POLICONt -0.032 -0.030 -0.030 -0.031 
 (-1.101) (-1.042) (-1.057) (-1.082) 
BSIZEt 0.039 0.041 0.036 0.040 
 (0.505) (0.526) (0.466) (0.514) 
INDPTt 0.042 0.049 0.035 0.047 
 (0.164) (0.191) (0.138) (0.184) 
Constant 2.243*** 2.254*** 2.318*** 2.249*** 
 (6.261) (6.287) (6.376) (6.285) 
YEAR Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153    
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.101 0.097 0.100 
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Table 6: Controlling for Endogeneity of Government Subsidies 
This table presents the results for the two-stage least squares regressions. Pro_Local is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the provincial leader is promoted from a lower position within the same 
province, and otherwise zero. Prob_Sub is the median percentage of subsidized firms in each 
industry-year-region group. Protect_Ind is a dummy variable that equals one for protected 
industries (i.e., high tech industry, agriculture, and public utilities), and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. The numbers reported in the parentheses are t-statistics 
clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based 
on two-tailed t-tests. 
  
Panel A: The effect of subsidies on cost of debt 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 SUBt CODt+1 NTSUBt CODt+1 TSUBt CODt+1 
SUBt  -8.069**     
  (-2.029)     
NTSUBt    -8.618**   
    (-2.120)   
TSUBt      -5.118 
      (-1.542) 
SIZEt -0.000*** -0.002 -0.000* -0.001 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-2.663) (-0.607) (-1.879) (-0.375) (-2.584) (-0.143) 
PROAt -0.024*** -0.420*** -0.025*** -0.445*** 0.001 -0.227*** 
 (-11.619) (-3.542) (-13.817) (-3.547) (1.413) (-4.850) 
LEVt -0.003*** -0.153*** -0.003*** -0.156*** 0.000 -0.124*** 
 (-3.820) (-4.679) (-4.428) (-4.723) (0.170) (-5.148) 
AGEt -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000*** 0.001 
 (-2.399) (0.327) (-0.360) (0.995) (-3.673) (0.718) 
SOEt 0.001** 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.002 
 (2.435) (0.372) (1.631) (0.049) (2.272) (-0.411) 
POLICONt 0.001** 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000*** -0.004 
 (2.503) (0.146) (1.490) (-0.358) (3.454) (-0.756) 
TANGIBLEt 0.002** -0.001 0.002*** -0.002 0.000 -0.017 
 (2.574) (-0.070) (2.634) (-0.102) (0.828) (-0.977) 
SGt 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.553) (0.547) (-0.365) (-1.111) (2.781) (0.583) 
COVERt -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 
 (-1.214) (0.317) (-0.312) (0.726) (-2.519) (0.610) 
BSIZEt -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.005 0.000* 0.002 
 (-0.286) (-0.163) (-0.802) (-0.392) (1.648) (0.227) 
INDPTt -0.001 -0.074 -0.003 -0.087* 0.001 -0.053 
 (-0.572) (-1.616) (-1.289) (-1.862) (0.769) (-1.429) 
Pro_Localt 0.001  0.001**  -0.000*  
 (1.571)  (2.522)  (-1.725)  
Prob_Subt 0.004***  0.003***  0.002***  
 (7.055)  (7.245)  (15.585)  
Constant 0.006 0.249*** 0.003 0.233*** 0.002 0.163*** 
 (0.782) (3.095) (0.424) (3.118) (0.951) (3.005) 
 
Underidentification Test: Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 
 98.24 (0.000) 102.81 (0.000) 133.68 (0.000) 
 
Weak Instrument Test: Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic (p-value) 
 62.365 (0.000) 62.687 (0.000) 72.897 (0.000) 
       
YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153    
Adjusted R2 0.106  0.105  0.132  
Wald Chi2  223.01  231.64  388.34 
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Panel B: The effect of subsidies on financial performance 
 Qt+1 OPROFITt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SUBt -18.997   1.219   
 (-1.266)   (1.177)   
NTSUBt  -21.119   1.774  
  (-1.162)   (1.434)  
TSUBt   -69.692***   3.979** 
   (-2.687)   (2.391) 
SIZEt -0.457*** -0.456*** -0.450*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (-22.206) (-21.984) (-23.635) (11.041) (10.976) (12.572) 
AGEt -0.141 -0.140 -0.119 -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.144*** 
 (-0.989) (-0.979) (-0.849) (-16.138) (-15.900) (-16.640) 
LEVt 0.008* 0.009** 0.006 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (1.730) (2.110) (1.276) (-1.322) (-1.659) (-0.928) 
CAPXt 0.523*** 0.518*** 0.447*** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.039*** 
 (3.469) (3.425) (3.502) (-4.450) (-4.577) (-4.927) 
SGt -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000** -0.000 
 (-7.350) (-6.541) (-2.707) (1.362) (2.218) (-0.796) 
SOEt -0.199*** -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-5.362) (-5.513) (-5.532) (-4.675) (-4.697) (-4.754) 
POLICONt -0.009 -0.016 0.005 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (-0.222) (-0.411) (0.134) (3.570) (3.778) (3.344) 
BSIZEt 0.067 0.060 0.106 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.797) (0.708) (1.247) (-0.356) (-0.219) (-0.745) 
INDPTt 0.933*** 0.904*** 1.008*** -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.072*** 
 (2.869) (2.751) (3.122) (-3.140) (-2.936) (-3.406) 
Constant 11.541*** 11.532*** 11.311*** -0.202*** -0.207*** -0.186*** 
 (22.423) (22.028) (26.361) (-6.365) (-6.368) (-7.257) 
       
Underidentification Test: Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 
 
99.813 
(0.000) 
103.994 
(0.000) 
134.074 
(0.000) 
99.813 
(0.000) 
103.994 
(0.000) 
134.074 
(0.000) 
Weak Instrument Test: Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic (p-value) 
 
63.51 
(0.000) 
63.758 
(0.000) 
73.077 
(0.000) 
63.51 
(0.000) 
63.758 
(0.000) 
73.077 
(0.000) 
       
YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 
Wald Chi2 4233.52 4290.20 4134.66 1148.02 1124.90 1166.39 
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Panel C: The effect of subsidies on social performance 
 EXC_EMPt+1 EXC_EMPt+1 EXC_EMPt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SUBt 13.431*   
 (1.694)   
NTSUBt  18.852**  
  (2.008)  
TSUBt   -7.436 
   (-0.615) 
SIZEt -0.071
*** -0.071*** -0.080*** 
 (-5.366) (-5.503) (-6.397) 
LEVt -0.152** -0.147** -0.172** 
 (-2.108) (-2.024) (-2.458) 
AGEt 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005** 
 (2.835) (2.635) (2.378) 
TANGIBLEt 0.128** 0.122** 0.123** 
 (2.372) (2.215) (2.252) 
ROSt 6.066*** 5.880*** 5.872*** 
 (3.749) (3.664) (3.560) 
CAPXt 0.074 0.063 0.158** 
 (0.926) (0.796) (2.345) 
SGt -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-4.510) (-3.092) (-2.947) 
SOEt 0.042** 0.042** 0.055*** 
 (2.158) (2.152) (2.927) 
POLICONt -0.034* -0.030 -0.023 
 (-1.685) (-1.492) (-1.155) 
BSIZEt 0.036 0.044 0.034 
 (0.812) (0.987) (0.758) 
INDPTt 0.030 0.062 0.020 
 (0.173) (0.354) (0.116) 
Constant 1.337*** 1.320*** 1.613*** 
 (4.118) (4.189) (5.491) 
    
Underidentification Test: Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 
 111.58 (0.000) 112.86 (0.000) 130.94 (0.000) 
    
Weak Instrument Test: Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic (p-value) 
 
69.319 (0.000) 68.175 (0.000) 70.984 (0.000) 
YEAR Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 
Wald Chi2 809.77 822.45 822.86 
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Table 7: Propensity Score Matching 
This table presents the results of propensity score matching (PSM). Panel A reports the covariate mean 
differences before and after the matching. Panel B reports the PSM results for cost of debt, financial 
performance and social performance, respectively. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, ** and * 
indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on a two-tailed t-tests. 
Panel A: Covariate balance diagnostics 
 
 Pre-matching Post-matching 
 With subsidy Without 
Subsidy 
Difference 
in Means 
(t-statistic) 
With subsidy Without 
Subsidy 
Difference 
in Means 
(t-statistic) 
SIZE 22.00 21.44 10.74*** 21.48 21.44 0.56 
PROA 0.03 0.02 3.05*** 0.02 0.02 1.24 
LEV 0.232 0.232 -0.08 0.229 0.232 -0.41 
AGE 15.50 16.06 -3.06 15.87 16.06 -0.71 
SOE 0.68 0.56 5.48*** 0.56 0.56 -0.11 
POLICON 0.17 0.16 0.59 0.15 0.16 -0.47 
TANGIBLE 0.46 0.48 -2.34** 0.48 0.48 0.37 
SG 62.26 28.72 0.35 24.90 28.72 -0.56 
COVER 6.47 7.68 -0.51 5.14 7.68 -0.65 
BSIZE 2.20 2.18 2.93*** 2.19 2.18 1.24 
INDPT 0.36 0.37 -0.30 0.36 0.37 -0.26 
 With 
non-tax-subsidy  
Without 
non-tax-subsidy 
Difference 
in Means 
(t-statistic) 
With 
non-tax-subsidy  
Without 
non-tax-subsidy 
Difference 
in Means 
(t-statistic) 
SIZE 22.00 21.51 9.85*** 21.57 21.51 0.81 
PROA 0.03 0.02 2.56** 0.02 0.02 0.90 
LEV 0.232 0.230 0.30 0.232 0.230 0.21 
AGE 15.55 15.76 -1.21 15.45 15.76 -1.25 
SOE 0.67 0.59 4.38*** 0.57 0.59 -0.59 
POLICON 0.17 0.16 0.58 0.15 0.16 -0.88 
TANGIBLE 0.46 0.48 -2.66*** 0.48 0.48 0.27 
SG 62.09 33.84 0.31 28.13 33.84 -0.63 
COVER 6.33 8.27 -0.86 7.05 8.27 -0.34 
BSIZE 2.20 2.19 1.94* 2.20 2.19 1.04 
INDPT 0.36 0.37 -0.46 0.36 0.37 -0.28 
 With 
tax-subsidy  
Without 
tax-subsidy 
Difference 
in Means 
(t-statistic) 
With 
tax-subsidy  
Without 
tax-subsidy 
Difference 
in Means 
(t-statistic) 
SIZE 22.20 21.79 10.51*** 22.20 22.17 0.66 
PROA 0.03 0.02 2.67*** 0.03 0.03 0.51 
LEV 0.233 0.232 0.32 0.233 0.235 -0.31 
AGE 15.32 15.69 -2.73*** 15.32 15.42 -0.62 
SOE 0.70 0.64 3.91*** 0.70 0.71 -0.46 
POLICON 0.19 0.16 2.43** 0.19 0.19 -0.05 
TANGIBLE 0.45 0.47 -3.18*** 0.45 0.45 -0.10 
SG 131.55 23.47 1.49 24.82 22.32 0.56 
COVER 5.53 7.18 -0.93 5.53 8.01 -1.22 
BSIZE 2.22 2.19 4.11*** 2.22 2.22 -0.14 
INDPT 0.37 0.36 2.15** 0.37 0.37 0.27 
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Panel B: Effects of subsidies on the cost of debt, financial performance and social performance 
Outcome variable = CODt+1 Mean Difference t-statistics 
Subsidized 
Unsubsidized 
0.079 
-0.014 -2.10** 
0.093 
    
With non-tax-based subsidies  
Without non-tax-based subsidies 
0.078 
-0.015 -2.39** 
0.093 
    
With tax-based subsidies 0.083 
-0.003 -0.69 
Without tax-based subsidies 0.086 
Outcome variable = Qt+1 Mean Difference t-statistics 
Subsidized 
Unsubsidized 
1.886 
-0.246 -3.04*** 
2.132 
    
With non-tax-based subsidies 
Without non-tax-based subsidies 
1.880 
-0.201 -2.77*** 
2.081 
    
With tax-based subsidies 1.859 
-0.085 -1.96* 
Without tax-based subsidies 1.944 
Outcome variable = OPROFITt+1 Mean Difference t-statistics 
Subsidized 
Unsubsidized 
0.028 
0.014 3.19*** 
0.014 
    
With non-tax-based subsidies  
Without non-tax-based subsidies 
0.026 
0.010 2.44** 
0.016 
    
With tax-based subsidies 0.031 
0.004 1.54 
Without tax-based subsidies 0.027 
Outcome variable = EXC_EMPt+1 Mean Difference t-statistics 
Subsidized 
Unsubsidized 
0.342 
0.095 2.49** 
0.247 
    
With non-tax-based subsidies 
Without non-tax-based subsidies 
0.323 
0.093 2.73*** 
0.230 
    
With tax-based subsidies 0.205 
0.012 0.64 
Without tax-based subsidies 0.193 
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Table 8: Lending from State-owned and Non-state-owned Banks 
This table presents OLS regression results regarding the effect of government subsidies in 
year t on cost of debt in year t+1. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. All variables 
except dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in 
parentheses are t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * 
indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed t-tests. 
Panel A: Non-state-owned banks 
 Dependent = CODt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUBt -0.798***    
 (-3.396)    
NTSUBt  -0.811***  -0.800*** 
  (-2.991)  (-2.909) 
TSUBt   -0.633 -0.575 
   (-1.380) (-1.227) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 916 916 916 916 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.058 0.052 0.057 
 
Panel B: State-owned banks 
 Dependent = CODt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUBt -0.747***    
 (-2.850)    
NTSUBt  -0.891**  -0.885** 
  (-2.384)  (-2.379) 
TSUBt   -0.726 -0.694 
   (-1.553) (-1.531) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 489 489 489 489 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.021 0.014 0.020 
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Table 9: Subsidies and Firm Performance: Change Specification 
This table presents OLS regression results regarding the effect of the change in government 
subsidies on the change in financial performance (in Panel A), and the change in social 
performance (in Panel B). All continuous variables are measured in changes and are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. The numbers 
reported in parentheses are t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. 
***, ** and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed 
t-tests. 
Panel A: Impact of subsidies on financial performance 
 Dependent=∆Q Dependent=∆OPROFIT 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆SUB -1.092* 
 
0.027 
 
 
(-1.93) 
 
-0.4 
 
∆NTSUB  -1.185**  0.004 
  (-1.97)  (0.05) 
∆TSUB  -2.8801  0.260 
  (-0.64)  (0.63) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,055 4,055 4,055 4,055 
Adjusted R-squared 0.424 0.424 0.041 0.041 
 
Panel B: Impact of subsidies on social performance 
 Dependent=∆EXC_EMP 
 
(1) (2) 
∆SUB 0.459*              
 (1.72)              
∆NTSUB  0.545*   
  (1.91) 
∆TSUB  -2.297 
  (-1.23)    
Control variables Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4,055 4,055 
Adjusted R-squared 0.087 0.087 
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Table 10: Cross-sectional Variations in Political Connection and Financial Health 
This table presents 2SLS regression results regarding the effects of government subsidies on cost of debt, financial and social performance conditional on 
political connection (in Panel A) and financial health (in Panel B). POLICON is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO or a chairman is defined as 
politically connected, i.e., if he or she is a current or former (1) government official, (2) military official, (3) member of the People’s Congress or (4) member 
of the People’s Political Consultative Conference. Loss is a dummy variable that equals one if pre-subsidy net income is below zero, and otherwise zero. 
Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The numbers reported in parentheses are 
t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on 
two-tailed t-tests. 
Panel A: Conditional on political connection 
 CODt+1 Q+1 OPROFITt+1 EXC_EMPt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
SUB -7.975**   -24.175   4.850***   15.133*   
 (-1.975)   (-0.942)   (2.768)   (1.667)   
NTSUB  -9.228**   -25.425   5.524***   22.117*  
  (-2.020)   (-0.847)   (2.771)   (1.934)  
TSUB   -6.707   -83.280**   6.496**   -4.593 
   (-1.626)   (-2.146)   (2.575)   (-0.320) 
POLICON -0.034** -0.032** -0.009 -0.101 -0.109 -0.052 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.042 0.059 -0.031 
 (-2.043) (-2.052) (-1.470) (-0.782) (-0.842) (-0.804) (3.983) (4.033) (3.747) (0.986) (1.327) (-1.415) 
POLI_SUB 7.438**   19.769   -5.135***   -15.944*   
 (1.980)   (0.788)   (-2.957)   (-1.813)   
POLI_NTSUB  8.586**   25.072   -6.043***   -24.019**  
  (2.005)   (0.841)   (-3.009)   (-2.161)  
POLI_TSUB   6.964*   64.000*   -6.743***   7.459 
   (1.684)   (1.653)   (-2.608)   (0.509) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 
Wald chi2 170.21 181.00 302.98 131.84 136.27 224.38 529.23 514.63 632.93 976.83 948.09 1100.90 
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Panel B: Conditional on financial health 
 CODt+1 Q+1 OPROFITt+1 EXC_EMPt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
SUB -12.140*   -31.891   7.025***   16.184   
 (-1.791)   (-0.834)   (2.793)   (0.839)   
NTSUB  -13.255*   -28.325   7.629***   24.454  
  (-1.924)   (-0.676)   (2.775)   (1.028)  
TSUB   -5.638   -76.287*   5.779**   -15.727 
   (-1.372)   (-1.931)   (2.341)   (-0.763) 
Loss -0.024 -0.022 0.011 0.104 0.114 0.162*** -0.006 -0.009 -0.035*** 0.059 0.084 0.019 
 (-0.907) (-0.926) (1.314) (0.673) (0.822) (2.634) (-0.618) (-0.929) (-8.700) (0.737) (1.042) (0.522) 
Loss_SUB 11.256*   25.309   -7.377***   -11.201   
 (1.700)   (0.673)   (-2.959)   (-0.587)   
Loss_NTSUB  12.398*   24.077   -8.211***   -20.295  
  (1.830)   (0.580)   (-2.992)   (-0.858)  
Loss_TSUB   4.494   23.157   -4.215   30.120 
   (1.090)   (0.607)   (-1.585)   (1.507) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 4,153 
Wald chi2 156.93 180.12 323.84 2537.28 2706.07 2478.54 597.82 598.93 752.89 401.46 379.06 377.71 
 
 
 
 
